Ever since the fleet arrived in Egyptian waters and anchored in Abu Kir Bay, the unlucky Bruise had not encountered anything smooth. First of all, he had landed in the wrong place with a badly organized operation. Then, on July 3, Bertier told him that Napoleon was very dissatisfied with his failure to block the new Alexandria port when the French attacked Alexandria, causing four huge Egyptian merchant ships to escape to the sea. Brues had not received any orders to leave Abu Kiir Bay to intercept merchant ships. Besides, he had to maintain his huge fleet in the storm and get his men and equipment ashore as soon as possible. On July 4, Napoleon ordered Brues to sail the fleet into the old port of Alexandria, on the condition that the wind weakened and the water depth allowed it.
Since Napoleon did not seriously collect and study geological and aquatic data before the war, he did not know whether his fleet could sail into this important port. He asked Bruyes to measure the depth of the water and report clearly whether the fleet could enter the harbor or anchor in Abu Kiir Bay and resist the enemy's attack. If the enemy was strong, the fleet should withdraw to the Corfu Strait (Nelson's fleet was reported to be equal to Bruyes's, with the French fleet carrying 1,287 cannons and the British fleet carrying 1,012 cannons, so there was little reason to withdraw to the Corfu Strait).
As usual, when Napoleon gave orders, he never considered how others would carry them out, or whether it was possible to carry them out. It was a time-consuming job to manually probe the water depth of the harbor waterway to determine whether a large and heavy warship could pass through. This work often took weeks, not a day or two as Napoleon thought. Later, Napoleon's order to Brues was changed to temporarily anchor the fleet in Abu Kiir unless they encountered a very powerful enemy fleet.
On July 1, the chaotic landing operation began. On July 3, Bruise sent a letter to Napoleon congratulating him on the capture of Alexandria, saying that it was a happy omen of continued success. He told Napoleon that although the preliminary results were not satisfactory, he would immediately begin to explore the depth of the water (the results were also not satisfactory). However, he suggested that his fleet could not continue to anchor in Abu Kiir Bay, because if the enemy's naval fleet of the same strength arrived at this time, they could completely destroy our entire fleet... if I was unlucky enough to still anchor here and wait for death. Then he told Napoleon, in a self-contradictory way, However, at present I cannot find any other place, no alternative berth... Leaving you would make me uneasy, and I have no other hope than to be able to at least support your operation. Napoleon made no changes to Bruise's conclusion.
Bruise was clear about his situation. Since he could not find a suitable waterway to allow the fleet to enter the safer Alexandria Port, he could only continue to anchor in Abu Kiir Bay until the cargo on the ship was unloaded. Although he was also afraid of being attacked by the British fleet there, he did not want to leave Napoleon, because that would put the entire French army in a situation where there was no sea security and no sea retreat in the event of an accident. His loyalty to Napoleon and the French army was evident.
Of course, there were other factors that made Bruise unable to determine the length of his stay, including the time needed to unload the troops, ammunition, horses, cannons, and thousands of chariots onto land, as well as the time needed to replenish the fleet's supplies for two months of sailing, such as ropes, sails, wood, fresh food, and water. These supplies were indispensable for any fleet preparing to go to sea.
In a secret report to Brux on July 9th, the Navy Grant Examiner, Jobell, pointed out that Alexandria Port lacked the conditions for the navy to dock. It did not even have the most basic facilities, such as dry docks, warehouses, workshops, etc. It would take at least a year to build these facilities. He thought that it was hard to say whether a small boat could enter the port, let alone a big boat! Under these circumstances, the general feeling is that we must sail for the Corfu Channel as soon as we have landed, because the British are not far from here and could show up at any time. He also said that Bruise's decision was completely different... The result was that the atmosphere here was so fatalistic that even my principles were slightly shaken.
As early as July 6th, Bruise's first official survey report stated that the entire Alexandria Port was unusable. At best, it was a dangerous port. Bruise reported the results to Napoleon, adding, Believe me, General, my greatest wish is to support your military operations. On the same day, Napoleon reported to the Governor: This conclusion completely messed up my plans. However, in his report to the Directorate the following month, he claimed that he had ordered Bruise to sail into Alexandria within twenty-four hours (this was a lie he made up to cover up the evidence).
After spending a few days with Alexander and the funding inspector, Jobert, Bruess returned to Abu Kir Bay. Due to the shallow waters and submerged reefs, he still had his fleet lined up in a row and anchored in the open sea four miles from the coast. Therefore, the defensive facilities on the shore, including the eight cannons on the fort and the mortars on the island, were unable to effectively protect the fleet. Bruise's plan to get fresh food and water for the fleet in July was also impossible. Because the wells in Abu Kiir Gulf could be attacked by Arabs at any time, the food reserves were far away in Rosetta and Tamia. Even Jobert, who was particularly disgusted with Bruise and strongly advocated that the fleet sail to the Corfu Strait before the British arrived, believed that the situation of the fleet was very critical. Bruise was currently unable to sail at sea.
In mid-July, the ship's food supply was so scarce that the captains, ignoring a series of previous orders, secretly wrote to General Menou (who was not a friend of Napoleon) to ask him for reinforcements. One of the captains, Tyffner, said angrily,"The real famine had begun. I shouldn't have come to this unlucky country. The usually emotionless treasurer of the Expeditionary Army, Pusiger, begged Napoleon,"The fleet needed emergency food reinforcements. He no longer had any funds at his disposal. Although the French army had looted a lot of property in Malta, Napoleon refused to distribute it, so he could not collect food for the fleet. The Egyptians wouldn't sell food to him if they couldn't get cash. According to Pussy's estimates, Bruise urgently needed 275 tons of rice, 330 tons of wood (fleet fuel), 80 cows, and 150 sheep. When Bruise learned that Menou was going to send six boats to carry emergency food to reinforce them, he said gratefully that it saved the people who were dying of hunger and thirst. In fact, before the expedition, the naval department provided sufficient supplies for Bruise's fleet, but most of them were transported ashore by Napoleon for his army to use.
This book comes from：m.funovel.com。