Changchun is closer to the base of Beiman. It would be easier to concentrate forces and support the Jiefang District by attacking Changchun first. If the enemy reinforcements or breaks through, it would also be easier to destroy the enemy in the long 300-kilometer range. After taking down Changchun, they were relieved of their worries and could concentrate their forces to fight in the south.
However, as early as when the winter offensive was still ongoing, the government pointed out that it was necessary to foresee the possibility of the enemy withdrawing from the northeast. For the strategic interests of our army, it is advantageous to seal off the Kuomingtang army in the northeast and wipe them out one by one."For this reason, they had to consider the southern front. First, they had to control the Beining Road's Jinzhou, Shanhaiguan, and Shanhaiguan and Luanxian sections. This plan closed the northeast gate and cut off the connection between the northeast enemy and the pass. It was also a strategic breakthrough in the middle, isolating Wei Lihuang and Fu Zuoyi on both sides.
As a strategist, he always looked at problems from the overall perspective. At this moment, he was no longer satisfied with the northeast. He thought of north China and the entire empire. His train of thought moved along the main artery of the Beining railway that connected Northeast China and North China.
Jinzhou was the throat of the Northeast Guomindang Army and the strategic point of contact with North China.
However, the Tang army had concerns about attacking the enemy's vital points and the heavily fortified big cities. If they could not take them down for a long time, the enemy's reinforcements would come and attack the Siping area like in 1947, which would definitely affect the battle situation. The shadow of the failure of the fourth level was like a nightmare.
The biggest defeats in the northeast were the second attack on Dehui in Jiangnan and the second attack on Siping in the summer offensive.
Jinzhou is heavily guarded and fortified. ** Worried about becoming another Siping?
On April 18, 1948, the Chinese government received a report signed by the leaders of the Northeast Field Army. It could be said that it mainly reflected the results of the Chinese government's consideration of the next battle. According to the report, the Northeast Field Army gathered nine columns and used the method of attacking the city to carry out the Battle of Changchun. The first step was to surround the city. If they could attract the enemy from Shenyang to reinforce the north, the main force would go south and annihilate the enemy in the field near Siping. If the enemy did not send reinforcements, they would launch a full-scale attack on Changchun. The plan was to end the battle in about ten days to half a month.
In order to prevent Jinzhou Fan Hanjie's regiment from joining up with the enemy in Mukden and then sending reinforcements to the north, it was suggested that Jinchaji send four or three columns to the east of Chengde or the north of Shanhaiguan to annihilate and suppress the enemy so that Fan Hanjie's regiment could not go north. They should also be prepared to join up with the northeast troops in autumn and winter. As for the problem of fighting southward, if our army were to advance on the line between Chinchou and Tangshan, eastern Hopei, or Pingsui, given that the enemy is now abandoning his secondary strongholds and concentrating his forces to defend the big cities, we would inevitably run into empty places or cities guarded by four or five divisions. Moreover, when the army entered those small areas, they would not be able to solve the problem of clothing, ammunition, and military expenses.
At the same time, the soldiers of the northeast would enter the pass. After a long journey, their morale would drop and escape would occur. With our main forces moving south, the enemy in Changchun will certainly be able to take advantage of the weakness to retreat to Mukden and open up the Jin-Shen line. Therefore, at present, the only way is to attack Changchun. The report said: These are our fundamental views on the war. Other suggestions had also been carefully considered, but they were all deemed inappropriate.
In terms of battle command, the government respected the opinions of the battlefield commander. This was because they had a realistic experience of the battlefield. If one's correct opinion was not accepted by his subordinates, he would always patiently persuade and wait.
The Tang army agreed to attack Changchun, but at the same time pointed out,"You, especially among the officers, should only say that it is more advantageous to attack Changchun first under the current circumstances. You should not emphasize the difficulties of fighting south, lest you and your officers be in a passive position mentally."”
In fact, it was a criticism of his fear of difficulties.
Seeing that the government had made up its mind, on April 22nd, the government sent the following reply: The reason why we agree to let you attack Changchun first is that it is more advantageous to attack Changchun first than to attack other places first, not because it is particularly disadvantageous or insurmountable. The difficulties you mentioned in attacking the vicinity of Mukden, the vicinity of Jinzhou, the Jinyu section, and the entry into the Pass are only imaginary difficulties that may not necessarily exist in reality, especially in the event that Changchun cannot be conquered. Therefore, you yourself, especially among the cadres, should only say that it is more advantageous to attack Changchun first under the present circumstances, and should not emphasize the difficulties of fighting south, lest you and the cadres be put in a passive position mentally.
Between the lines of the message, it clearly revealed the Chinese government's insistence on the idea of attacking Jinzhou.
He knew that the melon that was forced was not sweet, and it was not the time to force it.
In the telegram to Lin Luoliu and the Northeast Bureau, he reiterated: Don't talk too much about the difficult conditions of the southern war, or you will limit yourself mentally and lose your initiative.
The police were obviously giving them time.
Apparently, the police were waiting for the police to change their mind.
The stubborn Tang army didn't pay much attention to the Tang army's reminders, hints, and hopes. They focused on the northeast battlefield.
The autumn offensive had just ended. At the Northeast People's Liberation Army Chiefs of Staff meeting, he proposed the military guiding ideology of " large regiments, regularisation, and tough battles."
On the walls of the various military camps, the words "Train the soldiers well and attack Changchun" were painted. At the meeting, they said,"Train your soldiers well and attack Changchun." The letters of invitation and determination of the officers and soldiers were still written with the words "train the soldiers well and fight Changchun".
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